Reflection #2

I found today's lecture particularly interesting.  I know many people protested the Vietnam War (or conflict rather) and believed it was a mistake, but I believe that McNamara's reflection on the war and the many mistakes made throughout (the first mistake engaging in war) truly legitimizes that Vietnam was a conflict based on bad decisions.  As Professor Hass mentioned, the fact that McNamara is bold enough to look back upon the choices he made throughout the Vietnam Conflict as Secretary of War, shows that although he did not realize his mistakes at the time, he can reflectively look back and point out poor decisions made throughout the war.  I also think that McNamara's releasing of the film in 2003 - during the Iraq War - shows that McNamara sees similarities between the two conflicts and hopes that his realization of past mistakes will be noticed by others (e.g. the current government and/or secretary of war) and not be made again.  

I also think that it is interesting that there were many false pretenses of attack (e.g. the August 4 attack in the video) that were later confirmed as false, yet our defenses jumped on the war bandwagon before confirmation (or on the ambiguous presumption that: "We were definitely attacked... I think").  I think that the quotation from the video "Belief and seeing are both often wrong," has significance in this situation because if you want to believe something so badly (e.g. the U.S. forces thinking they were attacked by Vietnamese) you will see it (the sonar people thought that they picked up a missile attack when indeed they did not).

I also think that the concept of the domino effect - although it seems like it could be plausible - was a false assumption.  As McNamara said in the video of his conversation with the Vietnamese official - the Vietnamese would fight the Chinese until death - they would not simply "fall" as a domino would to communism.  Another reflection on the domino effect is perhaps a current day domino effect in the middle east in terms of the spread of terrorism.  The U.S also has a kind of counter-domino effect belief if you will - that if we spread democracy to Iraq, other Middle Eastern Countries will fall to Democracy.  

In conclusion, all wars will have opposition of some  kind, and the fact that McNamara, the Secretary of War during the Vietnam Conflict, is willing to acknowledge he was wrong, the terms in which he was wrong, and just how wrong he was, really validates that Vietnam was waged and conducted under false pretenses and drawn from unjust conclusions.  I am looking forward to reading the Herr reading to be able to compare his disoriented (as described by Professor Hass) dispatches of the Vietnam conflict and comparing it to Pyle's dispatch.